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[No. 81]

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING ON H. R. 11518, TO AUTHORIZE THE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN NAVAL VESSELS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, March 25, 1958.

The committee convened at 10 a. m., Hon. Carl Vinson, chairman of the committee, presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. I call up H. R. 11518:

That the President is authorized to undertake the construction of, or to acquire and convert, not to exceed twenty thousand tons of amphibious warfare vessels and landing craft.

SEC. 2. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for the construction, or for the acquisition and conversion of the foregoing vessels.

Now, the first witness is Admiral Felt, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral, you sit right there now and tell the committee why you need these additional—one amphibious transport dock and one amphibious assault ship, estimated to cost in the neighborhood of $69 million.

Admiral FELT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Admiral.

Admiral FELT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Admiral Felt, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Burke has asked me to tell you that he sincerely regrets his inability to appear before you this morning in support of bill H. R. 11518.

You will recall that when he made posture statements and testified regarding the Navy shipbuilding and conversion program during your hearings on the 31st of January and the 3d of February of this year, the bill you have before you today is very important to that shipbuilding program.

It is a privilege to appear in the stead of Admiral Burke and in support of the bill.

The Department of the Navy has been designated as the representative of the Department of Defense in this legislation.

The purpose of the bill is to authorize the President to construct 20,000 tons of amphibious warfare ships and landing craft.

There is available from previous authorization acts sufficient unobligated tonnage for the fiscal year 1959 shipbuilding program of the Navy except in the amphibious category. 4,282 unobligated amphibious tons remain from the act of March 10, 1951 (Public Law 3, 82d Cong.).

In the fiscal year 1959 program we are asking for 2 new amphibious ships, 1 conversion of a Mariner merchant hull to a much-improved amphibious attack transport, and 39 new amphibious landing craft.

The 2 new amphibious ships require additional tonnage authority, now estimated at 18,000 tons. The 39 landing craft tonnage of approximately 296 tons will be charged against presently available balances. The passage of this bill providing 20,000 additional tons would give us adequate amphibious tonnage authorization for the 1959 program. Rear Admiral Mumma, Chief of the Bureau of Ships, will discuss the tonnage balances for the entire shipbuilding program.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Briefly state to the committee the type of ship and its military functions. What kind of ship is that?

Admiral FELT. May I continue with my statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I thought you finished your statement.

Admiral FELT. No, sir.

One of the new ships is called an amphibious assault ship. It will be the second ship of her class, the first one having been authorized in the fiscal year 1958 program. It looks like an aircraft carrier, having a flight deck and a hangar. It is the ship specially designed to accommodate Marine Corps helicopters and troops who land in assault from their helicopter transports and effect a maneuver of vertical envelopment, having taken off from dispersed positions at sea. It will carry 20 of the large Marine assault helicopters and about 2,000 troops and their assault equipment. Additional ships of this type are planned for the future.

The other new ship is called an amphibious transport dock. It will be the first of her class—a brandnew design.

This ship fulfills a dual purpose. Like the amphibious assault ship, it will carry helicopters, useful in vertical envelopment, and will also carry landing troops and their heavy equipment over the beach. The boats will be carried in a well and will be loaded prior to being launched through an opening in the stern. This can be accomplished while the ship is still under way. The deck over the well housing the boats will provide a landing deck for six transport helicopters.

This ship will be the partner for the amphibious assault ship in the amphibious force of the future. It will transport and land about 900 troops and their landing equipment. It will be the means by which equipment and cargo that is essential for landing force operations, but too heavy to be transported by helicopter, will be delivered ashore to complement the assault elements landed by helicopter.

Additional ships of this type are also planned for the future.

The conversion of the Mariner hull to an attack transport is the second of its kind, the first having been authorized in the fiscal year 1957 program.

Three Mariner-type merchant ships were made available to the Navy from the Maritime Commission, for use in developing the fleet ballistic missile, Polaris. It was subsequently decided that only two would be needed for the Polaris program. It is planned to convert this hull to an attack transport, which can be accomplished at a relatively small cost.

This transport will have high speed—over 20 knots—and excellent accommodations for the troops. It will have space and facilities for an amphibious squadron commander, and provide him with the communications which are so essential to an amphibious assault.

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This ship will carry a battalion landing team and its essential assault equipment. The troops will be landed by the 29 landing craft and the 2 transport helicopters which this ship will carry.

When Admiral Burke appeared before you last month and made a posture statement, he said:

> As technology advances, our fleets must be composed of modern ships, aircraft, and equipment, in order that they will be able to cope with the weapons an enemy can throw against them.
>
> * * * We plan sufficient amphibious ships to land two Marine divisions. These will be modern ships. They will be designed to permit maximum utilization of the vertical assault technique, as well as to facilitate over-the-beach support when required. There is no single element of the national limited war capability more essential than the ability to put modern Marine forces ashore immediately after a limited aggression starts.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that we are currently engaged in a protracted war. So far, it is a war of limited operations—one side using feints, subversions, psychological maneuvers, various forms of violence, preparing for all manner of military armed violence. Our side is maintaining visible armed strength which must continue to be adequate to insure the safety of free peoples in the world. The burden of safeguarding freedom lies on the United States.

Required for the future is a multiple strategy for protracted conflict. The military support of our political and economic policies must furnish a position of strength from which these policies can be pursued with confidence.

In the rush toward advanced weapon systems, our capabilities to engage in wars of limited objectives cannot be neglected. Within the framework of a deadlock of mutual nuclear deterrance, the Russians can be expected to exploit systematically any weaknesses we display at reduced levels of conflict.

As Korea showed, any lowering of our guard in respect to limited war will tempt the Communists to armed aggression. Possession of strategic nuclear weapons did not in the past provide a cutrate escape from responsibilities in this area of warfare—and it will be even less effective in the future.

Political instability in many parts of the world underscores the importance of instant response and the ability to deliver and support masses of men and machines with minimal reliance on overseas support. The autonomy of seapower, as exemplified by the Navy's far-ranging carriers and amphibious forces, provides a means for the measured application of force—from the least to the greatest—adaptable with precision to the demands of any political situation and geography.

Whether or not one subscribes to the idea that limited war is possible between the United States and U. S. S. R., it is clear that the United States needs limited war capabilities for dealing with nonnuclearly armed aggressors—such as possibly Red China, Egypt, Syria, North Korea. The French-British failure at Suez was the result of inability to apply the right force at the right place fast enough. We must be warned by their example against lowering our readiness for instant operations anywhere.

The purpose of a limited war is to change an opponent's policies or his actions in a limited area. It does not seek to crush him. It at-

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tempts to demonstrate through force that a change of policy or action on his part would be more profitable, or less harmful, to him than continuation of current policies and actions. The limited war seeks to impose a toehold on one's opponent, rather than a stranglehold. There is still some room for wrestling. The strategy of limited war requires a willingness of our Nation to risk or engage in wars that promise no clear-cut total victory.

For wars to remain limited, there should continue to be a readiness to negotiate after military action has been undertaken—and a willingness to settle for less than the maximum, if circumstances demonstrate that to be the best thing to do. Opportunities to change objectives without loss of face should remain open to both sides. Neither side should be driven into a corner from which an act of desperation appears to him to be the only way out. National emotions must be held within reasonable bounds. An obvious readiness to use maximum force, including nuclear weapons, may be necessary to achieve desired objectives in limited war and to check any inclination on the part of the opponent to expand or intensify the conflict.

A war of limited objectives probably will not be fought in the United States or in the U. S. S. R. It will be fought over a third country. To help that third country we must exert our power—limited and discriminating power—on the other side of some ocean. We must get it there quickly and get it ashore quickly. We may have to supply it there for protracted periods. We cannot do these things without three capabilities.

First, a capability to control the sea routes to and surrounding the area of aggression—and any other sea routes along which we are threatened or harassed.

Second, a capability to strike within the area of aggression—to strike precisely and with discrimination, using weapons appropriate to the scale of the war, and inflicting minimum harm on our friends ashore.

Third, a capability to put forces promptly ashore in the area against whatever resistance there may be.

The great bulk of our future Navy is designed to meet these needs—to provide the spear and the shield for the free world's ability to defeat limited aggression without incurring unlimited catastrophe.

The mission for naval forces of the future will not have changed. The forces will retain characteristics passed down through the years from generation to generation—flexibility and versatility. The shield is still fashioned out of defensive ASW forces. The spear is the striking forces—carrier air and amphibious.

It is in this context, that the Navy is asking for enactment of legislation to authorize amphibious tonnage in the amount of 20,000 tons. It is essential to a program of replacing a part of the fleet which is getting old and worn out. On behalf of the Department of the Navy, I strongly recommend your favorable consideration of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral. I want to compliment you on the fine statement, because it gives the underlying philosophy of why it is so important that there should continue to be a worthwhile and healthy naval construction program going along.

Now, simply in regard to this bill, I understand it provides in part, for one amphibious transport dock. My information and in

examining the information sent from the Department, that is a ship that will be approximately 500 feet long, is that correct?

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The tonnage will be in the neighborhood of 7,300 tons.

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it will cost in the neighborhood of $29 million.

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, to carry a picture of it in my mind, you might classify it as a mother ship. It will carry different types of amphibious track, is that correct?

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you will open it at the bow and the boats will come out and from there they will operate, if it is necessary.

Admiral FELT. Opening in the stern, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the stern, the end or the stern.

Now, as to the amphibious assault, that is a ship that will be approximately 592 feet long.

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it will cost in the neighborhood of $40 million.

Admiral FELT. Correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have described in your statement the military mission of it. That is on which the personnel will be for landings and for the helicopters.

Admiral FELT. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, have plans been drawn for these two types of ships?

Admiral FELT. Yes, sir

The CHAIRMAN. When will you be able to let the contract on these ships?

Admiral FELT. If you will permit me, sir, I would like for Admiral Mumma to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral MUMMA. We anticipate the ability to let contracts in the early part of fiscal year 1959, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the money been set up in the 1959 budget, that is before the Appropriations Committee, for these two ships?

Admiral MUMMA. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Then these two ships will become a part of the shipbuilding and conversion program now provided for in the 1959 budget?

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We are building and converting some 110 ships, are we not, under the program now, in the 1959 budget?

Admiral MUMMA. Yes, including craft, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Including craft?

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to follow the policy of providing these two types of ships between industry and the Navy yards, or what is your policy in regard to that?

Admiral MUMMA. The exact distribution of the ships in the 1959 program has not been decided upon, Mr. Chairman, because of the fact that we don't know the exact content that the Congress will approve.

We normally follow the provisions of the Vinson-Trammel Act, which properly disposes the ships between naval shipyards and private yards in a fashion that they are both adequately loaded with shipbuilding work.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, we have used up all of the tonnage of this type that was provided for in the Vinson-Trammell Act, and that is the reason we have to get authorization for these ships.

Admiral MUMMA. You probably recall, Mr. Chairman, that the Vinson-Trammell Act was fundamentally for warships and that tonnage is still available. There is still a residue of tonnage available from Vinson-Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Admiral MUMMA. But this new category of amphibious and landing craft came into being during World War II.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have to get specific authorization?

Admiral MUMMA. And we need new tonnage authority.

The CHAIRMAN. In each, then, for amphibious craft?

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. Could I ask him a question right there about the Vinson-Trammell Act? Did the Vinson-Trammell contemplate the reserve shipyards owned by the Navy?

Admiral MUMMA. No, sir; it was not visualized at that time.

Mr. RIVERS. It didn't visualize that. So when you have your conversion and construction and repair, does the Vinson-Trammell Act come into consideration when you contemplate your overall program between your reserve yards and your naval shipyards?

Admiral MUMMA. If you are contemplating a mobilization situation, Mr. Rivers, I think that the ability of the shipyards, that is, the naval shipyards, to take their share of the load under Vinson-Trammell would be very, very limited, because of the large amount of damage repair load that they would have.

So there would be exceptions from Vinson-Trammell in the public interest, certified by the President, to put the additional load in private yard and in these industrial reserve shipyards.

Mr. RIVERS. What would be your priority? Your industrial yards and then the Navy yards?

Admiral MUMMA. No, sir. We normally put special kinds of work in the naval shipyards. That is No. 1 priority, to determine exactly what should go in the naval shipyards. Next, everything else goes out on contract bidding. Then, of course, industrial reserve yards are not active at the present time, so they don't enter into the peacetime operation.

Mr. RIVERS. Some of them are active. Some of them are very active.

Admiral MUMMA. Not very many of them, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. I see.

Admiral MUMMA. That are bidding on big shipbuilding programs.

The CHAIRMAN. Now——

Mr. RIVERS. This is important, because Senator Butler introduced a bill recently to put 75 percent of all the repair work into private yards, irrespective of the Navy yards.

Mr. HARDY. You are taking that seriously, are you?

Mr. RIVERS. You are familiar with that, aren't you?

Admiral MUMMA. Yes, I am, Mr. Rivers.

I would say that this would be a very adverse situation because of the fact that the reason we keep a certain building load in the naval shipyards is that they have that resilence to take not just overhaul load in time of war but major battle damage repair, which is far greater in quantity than normal overhaul. So they have to have this kind of resilience for growth in time of war. The ships do not stay undamaged.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, please. I want to get this in the record. The concept of your naval shipyards is first repair.

Admiral MUMMA. Correct, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. That is the concept of your shipyards?

Admiral MUMMA. Fundamentally, that is correct.

Mr. RIVERS. Fundamentally. Then on any repair, your first priority is your naval shipyards?

Admiral MUMMA. That is normally correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, members of the committee, I regret to say that I think it is necessary to take a recess now. I am not going to rush this bill. There are $70 million in it. We must get all the facts. But we must be on the floor at 11 o'clock.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. We wil take a recess until tomorrow morning. I hope every member will be on the floor this morning when they bring up the pay bill.

(Whereupon, at 10: 45 a. m., the committee adjourned.)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, March 26, 1958.

The committee met at 10 a. m., the Honorable Carl Vinson (chairman of the committee) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee come to order.

Now members of the committee, this is a continuation of the hearing on H. R. 11518.

Yesterday, when the committee recessed we were asking questions with reference to the assignments that are given to navy yards, in rgard to repair of ships.

Mr. Rivers, have you any further questions?

Mr. RIVERS. I was inquiring yesterday about the concept of the navy yards to do repair work. They weren't created to do new work. Mostly, what they were created for was repair work. And I had in mind the bill that was introduced by the Senator from Maryland, Mr. Butler, directing that 75 percent of the repair work go to private yards.

The question I wanted to ask Admiral Felt or Admiral Mumma was, What would be the effect of that bill of that character should it pass?

Would it close up the navy yards?

Admiral FELT. You better take that.

Admiral MUMMA. It would have practically that effect, sir, because of the fact that we now do approximately two-thirds to three-fourths of our repair work in naval shipyards, and this would reverse the percentage.

The reason that we do such a high percentage of our repair work in naval shipyards is that we have a special skilled group of people who are gotten together for the purpose of taking care of that very difficult repair work.

And this is fundamentally building a base for damage repair in time of actual conflict.

So that this damage repair becomes much greater in volume than the private yards could handle or the naval shipyards could handle without this capacity.

For instance, during the war, it was essential that we do what would ordinarily take 4 or 5 or 6 months in a repair yard—we do it in 30 days, in order to get the ship back on the line.

And this kind of capacity was built into the naval shipyards. And there is no other way in which that capacity that we visualize—no other way that it could be handled by a competitive arrangement across the country that would give us the resilient manpower in order to take care of that battle-damage condition.

Mr. RIVERS. Then, too, you have the reserve shipyards, the ones that you lease to private contractors, where you have a lot of your floating drydocks, is that right?

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct, Mr. Rivers.

Mr. RIVERS. And don't you have a program for giving them as much work as you can to keep them in a ready condition?

Admiral MUMMA. In times of peace we find that those yards are fundamentally utilized on repair and minor construction, and because of the necessity for keeping construction capability—that is the reason we have these reserve shipyards. Now we are not able in time of peace to allocate work in other than areas.

We don't allocate it to an individual yard.

The competitive angle takes care of where it goes within naval distribution, as I think you are well aware, Mr. Rivers.

Mr. RIVERS. I was interested to hear the admiral speak about the know-how and the ready capability. I think it is a very fine response to my inquiry. Because that is what I had in mind when I asked the question. Because the know-how is an invaluable asset.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Rivers.

Now members of the committee, I will have to ask Mr. Miller, and Mr. Wilson and Mr. Kelleher to please go to the Rules Committee to present at 10:30 the application for a rule on the winter Olympic games, that we could not pass by a two-thirds majority the other day. Now, any other questions by any other members of the committee?

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Durham.

Mr. DURHAM. Admiral Mumma, at the present time how is the employment in the naval shipyards? Is it running about like it was last year, or is it lower or what is the condition. We are concerned now about the employment as well as shipbuilding.

Admiral MUMMA. No, sir, it is somewhat lower than last year.

Mr. DURHAM. How much?

Admiral MUMMA. We have dropped about 7,000 employees, in the past year, sir.

Mr. DURHAM. 7,000?

Admiral MUMMA. 7,000; yes, sir.

Mr. DURHAM. 7,000 out of how many?

Admiral MUMMA. Out of approximately 100,000 at the beginning of the year.

Mr. DURHAM. Almost 10 percent?

Admiral MUMMA. Yes, sir.

Mr. DURHAM. How serious is that? Where do those people go to? It seems like to me it would be the experienced personnel. If you are going to let them go, why——

Admiral MUMMA. We feel that many of them have gravitated into a corresponding buildup in some portions of the commercial shipyards. There has been a somewhat higher workload in the commercial yards because of tankers, and so forth, however, this work load is beginning to taper off, also.

I would think that the balance between the naval shipyards, and the private yards, which historically in recent years has been about equal—the private yards have a little more employment now than do the naval shipyards.

Mr. DURHAM. Will the authorization for this shipbuilding program make any difference in the employment?

Admiral MUMMA. There would be some slight buildup in certain areas in the shipbuilding business, yes, sir, with the 1959 shipbuilding program.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much——

Admiral MUMMA. It would not be radical, however.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bates.

Mr. BATES. Admiral Felt, I would like to ask a question about this amphibious assault ship. Is that the one you are going to use the helicopters on as a flight deck, and a hangar deck?

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. BATES. Well, I think the natural question to ask about that is why we don't use some of our reserve fleet carriers for such purposes.

Admiral FELT. We have converted two small carriers to this type of ship in the past, the *Thetis Bay* and the *Block Island*.

We have even had under consideration converting some of the bigger carriers to this type of ship.

We find that the marines are very unhappy about these conversions because we can't get into them the facilities that the marines want.

They can't accommodate enough combat troops, they can't accommodate enough combat equipment, and can't move it around readily and up on to the flight deck to put into helicopters.

In connection with the thought of converting some of the larger carriers, we run into the problem of the cost of operating the larger ship. It takes a lot more people to operate the larger ship than this new one.

One other little rule of thumb that we have: Remembering that the older ships are 15 years old, if it is going to cost, let's say two-thirds to convert an old ship as it is to build a new ship that will have 20 or 25 years' life in it, we think it is worth while building the new ship.

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Mr. BATES. Have you made a full analysis of this, that might be in writing and available to the committee? Because, I am certain this is one of the problems that is going to come up in connection with this bill.

Because essentially, either your *Essex* class, or your old CVE hull small carriers, could be used—perhaps not as effectively as you might think, but nevertheless, I am certain this thing will come up on the floor. So I think we ought to be prepared to meet any questions along that line.

Admiral FELT. We have studies on this, of course, but in direct response to your question as to whether we have a paper, I am not sure that we do.

Mr. BATES. Well, can you give us a full analysis?

Admiral FELT. Yes.

Mr. BATES. And supply it for the record.

Admiral FELT. We can, Mr. Bates.

(The information requested is as follows:)

The Navy supplies the following in response to committee questions regarding the advantages of building a new amphibious assault ship (LPH) as compared to converting an existing ship. Conversions can be accomplished at less cost. However, in this particular type of ship, lesser cost is accompanied by considerable sacrifice of combat effectiveness. The U. S. S. *Thetis Bay* (CVHA–1) in the fiscal year 1955 program, consisting of austere conversion of a World War II *Kaiser* or CVE–55 class carrier, was accomplished at a cost of $10,630,000. A larger ship, the *Block Island*, which was formerly a *Cimarron* type tanker built in 1939, is being converted to the LPH–1, as part of the fiscal 1957 program, at an approximate cost of $29,139,000. In comparison, the first new amphibious assault ship, the LPH–2, in the fiscal 1958 program will be built at an estimated total cost of $48,119,000 and the follow ship in the fiscal 1959 program at a cost of $40 million.

Our studies also revealed that the *Essex* class conversion would require about twice the number of personnel to operate as the other two types and operation and upkeep costs of the ship would be much greater. For these reasons, it was determined that this type should not be used for conversion to an amphibious assault ship.

Mr. BATES. Now, these new attack transports, the 20 knots, our present APA's will do 20 knots, won't they?

Admiral FELT. No.

Mr. BATES. Not quite.

Admiral FELT. No.

I think it is well to remember—well, some of them will. Let me correct that and say some of them will.

It is well to remember that the APA's are essentially merchant ships that were converted to amphibious ships during World War II, and they were never intended to steam in formations, where you are jockeying the throttle back and forth, and they were intended to have the throttle set and steam as a merchant ship does. And they are really wearing out.

Mr. BATES. Well, you want to for the record amplify that a little bit more, because I am certain people will ask about that, too.

Admiral FELT. Yes.

(The information requested is as follows:)

We do not have any 20-knot attack transports in our fleets today. We have one, U. S. S. *Paul Revere*, a Mariner conversion, to be commissioned in August which will have a speed in excess of 20 knots. The other attack transports in our fleets were built for World War II and have a speed of less than 18 knots.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to develop along the line of Mr. Bates, if the committee will permit me. That is a very important question that has been raised.

The other day we authorized the scrapping of some 7 ships because it was not economical to convert them. Now, why isn't it possible to find some ship in the mothballed fleet that can take the place of this amphibious assault ship, that is going to cost $40 million? Have you made a study to see if you can find a ship that you could convert and have the same military characteristics and meet the same requirements of this proposed new ship that is going to cost, as I just said, $40 million.

Admiral FELT. Yes, sir; we have made these studies.

We find first that conversions will not meet the military characteristics that are desired.

Secondly, a conversion will cost approximately two-thirds the price of a new ship, conversion of a real old ship.

Nevertheless, we are continuing to study this because we want to do the job as cheaply as we can do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then are we in a position to say to the House the Navy Department has made a complete study and a complete survey and they are unable to find any ship that is in the mothballed fleet that can be converted to meet the needs of what is known as an amphibious assault ship; is that correct?

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir. We can't find a ship in the mothballed fleet that will meet the military requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Thank you very much.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I just had one further question.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, go right ahead.

Mr. BATES. Admiral, it appears that we have no use for our small or larger carriers for this particular purpose, and with the advent of jet planes, since a lot of these ships were built, I wonder why we just don't get rid of Reserve Fleet, as far as carriers are concerned? What are we keeping them for? We won't have any Corsairs or F6F's around.

What are we going to use them?

Admiral FELT. You are talking of course, Mr. Bates, of the carriers? The Reserve Fleet.

Mr. BATES. Yes, sir.

Admiral FELT. Well, we have continued use for them in the field of ASW. As you will remember, as we get a new carrier it goes into the ASW work. All the *Essex* class type carriers—I suppose those are the ones you are thinking of—are useful in ASW because from them we operate airplanes that don't have this high performance that you are thinking of when you mention the jets.

Mr. BATES. Are you continuing to maintain an inventory of planes that can be used from an *Essex*-type carrier? Is that in your long-range planes?

Admiral FELT. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, we have reoriented our Naval Reserve program to put primary emphasis on ASW.

Mr. BATES. The present carriers will fly what type of planes?

Admiral FELT. What is known as the S2F, the Grumman antisubmarine plane, and ASW helicopters.

Mr. BATES. Do you feel that the requirements for that type of thing would justify the maintenance of as many carriers as we presently are carrying in our inventory, or should we start cleaning house a little bit?

Admiral FELT. No, sir, I do not feel that it justifies the retention of as many as we have in the Reserve Fleet.

As a matter of fact, we have our Reserve fleet ships divided into four categories, and we would like very much to dispose of what we call class C and D categories, because they are of no real military value any longer.

Mr. BATES. You could certainly start there, because it appears that in almost all of these bills we have here, we can never utilize any of these ships on any current purposes, excepting the ASW work as you indicated a moment ago. I don't know what we are going to do with our battleships. There we are. I think some of you ought to be giving a little thought to those, because they are taking up valuable space in many of the inland channels in this country.

Admiral FELT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bates.

Mr. Doyle——

Mr. DOYLE. Admiral, you mentioned a reduction in force of 7,000 out of 100,000. Was the reduction pretty generally nationwide, or was one area hit harder than another out of the seven thousand?

Admiral MUMMA. It was pretty uniform geographically except in 1 or 2 of the larger yards which took a little larger proportion of the reduction.

Mr. DOYLE. Was that considered a permanent peacetime reduction or was it temporary?

Admiral MUMMA. Well, we didn't have the money to pay the larger number of personnel. So we did cause the reduction to stay within the funds available.

Mr. DOYLE. And the reduction was made necessary because the Navy didn't have enough money to keep them?

Admiral MUMMA. That is right, sir.

Mr. DOYLE. Did you have need for them?

Admiral MUMMA. That is a very good question as to what the rate of scheduling should be. Obviously, there is an optimum economic rate and that is what we normally try to schedule in peacetime, is the rate that causes the lowest overall cost.

Mr. DOYLE. Well, was the reduction which you made of the 7,000 because Congress didn't give you the money you asked for?

Admiral MUMMA. No, sir, it was not, sir.

Mr. DOYLE. May I ask this question. I notice in line 4 of the bill you use the language: "or to acquire and convert."

I am thinking of the word "acquire" which is a word which is generally used to purchase or get possession of something that you don't now have possession of. Is it a fact that you intend to buy some ships and then remodel them? You do intend to buy some ships to reconvert. Where are you going to buy them, and how?

Amiral MUMMA. I think it is a repetition of previous language, Mr. Doyle, which indicates that we do purchase after a fashion from private industry.

Mr. DOYLE. Well, how much work are you going to buy from private industry, approximately?

Admiral MUMMA. Well, this language "construction of, to acquire and convert," gives us flexibility to do it in any of the most efficient fashions.

Mr. DOYLE. I know it does.

But my question is how many million dollars are you going to spend to acquire ships from industry, approximately?

Admiral MUMMA. We don't actually intend to buy any completed ships from industry. We plan to have them constructed to our own account, specifically.

Mr. DOYLE. Well, do you plan to buy any partially constructed ships from industry?

Admiral MUMMA. No, sir. We plan to accept from the Maritime Administration a mariner ship, which is the last of those available to us, and has been already turned over to the Navy. This ship will be converted to APA.

Mr. DOYLE. That only applies, then, to one ship?

Admiral MUMMA. One ship, yes, sir.

Mr. DOYLE. That is the reason you used the word "acquire."

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct.

Mr. DOYLE. It will apply to one ship.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask what do you classify an APA?

Admiral MUMMA. An APA——

Admiral FELT. An amphibious attack transport—amphibious transport attack.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Admiral FELT. Amphibious transport attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, the bill provides for an amphibious assault ship. That is the same kind you are going to get from the Maritime Commission.

Admiral FELT. There is the LPH, which is the new ship with the hangar on it—I mean with the flight deck on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, to clear up the point raised by Mr. Doyle, are you going to have two of that type of ship?

You say you are going to build one of an amphibious assault. And from Mr. Doyle's question, you are going to get a ship of that character to be used from the Maritime Commission; is that correct?

Admiral FELT. We want two new ships in our 1959 bill, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right, I understand that. And one of them is an amphibious transport dock.

Admiral FELT. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Which I classified yesterday as a mother ship.

Admiral FELT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And then the other one is an amphibious assault ship.

Admiral FELT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, from the answer to Mr. Doyle, you stated, because the word "acquired" is in here, you are going to get a ship of that character from the Maritime Commission.

Then in addition, you will build one, too?

Admiral FELT. Oh, no, sir.

We convert this Maritime ship into an amphibious transport.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the ship you are going to get from the Maritime Commission will be converted, to be known as an amphibious assault ship; is that it?

Admiral FELT. Amphibious transport.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not build that ship?

Admiral FELT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Then that raises the question why are you going to spend $40 million on converting that type of ship?

Admiral FELT. There are no more Mariners, in the first place, available to us.

The CHAIRMAN. No more what?

Admiral FELT. No more Mariner hulls will be available to the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the committee can understand your building only one ship, and that is known as an amphibious transport dock; is that correct, and then you are obtaining from the Maritime Commission a hull that you are going to convert and make an amphibious assault ship out of; is that correct—transport?

Admiral FELT. Plus one more new ship, Mr. Chairman. Build two new ships, and convert the Mariner hull.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you will have two amphibious assault ships, will you, under this bill—one you build and one you get from the Maritime Commission.

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. I got it clear in my mind.

Mr. GAVIN. I am surprised at the Navy. They usually come over and brief you, Mr. Chairman, very thoroughly before they come in here. In this occasion, it appears they certainly didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you, Mr. Gavin.

Mr. GAVIN. Or you wouldn't be interrogating them the way you are now.

The CHAIRMAN. I will say unfortunately that didn't happen. I brief myself on different lines, but not on this line. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Mr. Doyle?

Mr. DOYLE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Doyle——

Mr. DOYLE. Is that ship you are getting from the Maritime Commission an American-built ship or was it built in a foreign yard?

Admiral MUMMA. No, sir; she was built in the United States.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bray.

Mr. BRAY. Admiral, I am rather interested in the fact that you are working on this amphibious ship dock. Last year we were briefed—I don't believe the Navy did the briefing—that they would not need the assault boats like the LCM and LCVP. They said they were going to land by air, and not by boat. So I am rather happy that the Navy has given serious thought to getting their equipment ashore.

Now, is this similar to the LSD, landing ship dock, of World War II?

Admiral FELT. It is the same idea; yes, sir.

Mr. BRAY. It is the same. Your well will be the same, but then you will have a superstructure over that to hold the weight of the helicopters and their necessary facilities for them.

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. BRAY. Could you take those LSD's and put a superstructure over it? Is it built so as to take care of helicopters?

Admiral FELT. Let me refer that to the Chief of the Bureau.

Mr. BRAY. Your present LSD's, in World War II.

Admiral MUMMA. That would be possible; yes, sir. It is possible that that might be added to the LSD's. As you may know, we have built eight of them since World War II—new ones.

Mr. BRAY. I didn't know that.

Admiral MUMMA. And these new ones could very well have this deck added.

Mr. BRAY. Your old ones couldn't without making them top heavy, and making some very material changes in the strength of the hull; isn't that right?

Admiral MUMMA. It would be a difficult task to add them to the World War II ships; yes, sir.

Mr. BRAY. Now, what kind of ships or boats will you have inside of this well? You will have a larger boat than the LCM's, I imagine.

Admiral MUMMA. Will you take that?

Admiral FELT. It is a personnel boat primarily, for personnel and their light equipment, similar to the concept of World War II.

We have pictures of these here, Mr. Chairman, if the committee would like to see them.

Mr. BRAY. I won't pursue it too far, but I was rather curious as to—for instance, when you are landing tanks, medium tanks, you would have them in something similar to the LCM's?

Admiral FELT. That is right.

Mr. BRAY. You are still going to have the lighters in there, to let the water in, which would eliminate the necessity of moving anything——

Admiral FELT. Load the equipment in the boats in the well, flood the well, open the door, and they go out.

Mr. BRAY. It is an LSD, then, that takes care of the landing on the beach, together with the helicopters that will give it the dual purpose of air and water?

Admiral FELT. That is correct, Mr. Bray. In other words, it answers the question that was in your mind previously—this way from the sky [indicating by hand] and over the beaches with the heavy equipment.

Mr. BRAY. And your helicopters, and you will carry your bulldozers and heavy equipment in from the boat.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bray.

Mr. Devereux——

Mr. DEVEREUX. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to congratulate the Navy on keeping abreast of the changing situation so far as the amphibious forces are concerned. If you will remember, I had a great interest in that. I have been plugging for it for a number of years. And I am delighted to find that the Navy is keeping abreast and has new suggestions and new concepts, so that we will not lag behind in that, in my judgment, very important field.

Particularly in view of the fact that we may have our ports bombed out in any future operation and the movement of supplies and troops over the beach or by helicopter may be much more important than it is at the present moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Devereux.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted to ask a brief question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you may be permitted to ask a brief question.

Mr. GAVIN. Admiral Felt, and Admiral Mumma, you have heard of the Philadelphia Navy Yard?

Admiral MUMMA. Yes, sir.

Mr. GAVIN. I just wanted to know. You just spoke about it. I just wanted to call their attention to it. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Gavin.

Now members of the committee——

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Becker——

Mr. BECKER. Yes; I would like to ask one question of the admiral because he was hesitant in his answer. I think it is important.

The question was asked you about the reduction of 7,000 men in the naval shipyards.

You gave a definite answer that it was because of lack of funds; is that correct?

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct, sir.

Mr. BECKER. But then, when you were asked was this 7,000 needed or did the lack of the 7,000 impede the work of the naval shipyards, you hesitated in your answer. Why?

Admiral MUMMA. The lack of funds caused rescheduling of some ships. So some of the schedules were extended or stretched out. And this was caused by the lack of availability of funds.

Mr. BECKER. Well, but did you need the men in order to do the work?

Admiral MUMMA. We could have utilized the men if we had had the funds available. That is the answer, Mr. Becker.

Mr. BECKER. Then you would have completed the work sooner, would you not have?

Admiral MUMMA. That is right.

Mr. BECKER. Then, when you would have concluded the work sooner, what would have happened to the men, the 7,000 men?

Admiral MUMMA. We assumed there would be additional work following on in later year programs.

Mr. BECKER. Well, was there additional work to be done?

Admiral MUMMA. There is; yes, sir.

Mr. BECKER. There is.

In other words, you need the 7,000 men.

Admiral MUMMA. If the 1959 program is authorized, we will have to hire some additional men, yes, sir.

Mr. BECKER. But at the present time, you don't then?

Admiral MUMMA. Well, the 1959 program phases in on the end of the other previous programs. So by the time the 1959 program would begin working, that is the fiscal 1959 shipbuilding program, we would find that we would need some buildup in personnel.

Mr. BECKER. Then I take it, the way you are answering the question, that your rescheduling is causing your 1958 to lap over into 1959, then.

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct. Yes, sir.

Mr. BECKER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Becker.

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne.

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Mumma, I was glad to hear you say that you heard of the Philadelphia Naval Yard.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just wondering—we are all familiar. I was just wondering when Mr. Byrne was when he was acquainting the Navy that there was a Philadelphia Navy Yard. But I see Mr. Byrne also was concerned about it.

Thank you, Mr. Byrne.

Mr. BECKER. I might ask you the same question: the New York Naval Shipyard also.

Admiral MUMMA. Yes, sir.

Mr. BATES. Also South Boston.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Byrne.

Mr. BYRNE. Everyone is interested in distress areas. You know Philadelphia is distressed with unemployment; 156,000 people unemployed. It seems that every time the Navy has to lay off anyone they come up to Philadelphia. When they have any work to give out, they just drive right through Philadelphia.

Now, Admiral, see what you can do to bring some of this work into the Philadelphia Naval Base. Because constantly, when the layoffs come, they hit right in the Philadelphia Naval Base.

Thank you, Mr. Gavin, for——

Mr. GAVIN. Would the gentleman yield?

What the gentleman says is absolutely correct. It is a depressed area. And if the Department of the Navy in any way can direct work to the Philadelphia Naval Yard, I certainly hope they will give it their immediate and serious consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course I join in that. The Philadelphia Navy Yard is one of the most outstanding naval yards of this country. Some great ships have been built in the Philadelphia yard. I remember way back in the days when Mr. Butler, from Chester, Pa., was chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee. I became quite familiar with the Philadelphia Navy Yard. And it is an important yard. And should be given most careful consideration in whatever repair work is necessary. And that applies to these other yards where there is a great number of unemployed.

Mr. BATES. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It applies to the Boston yard, and it applies to all of them.

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put down for the record a very short statement. I think you have made the very finest statement that has been made to this committee during the time I have had the honor to be on it, on this very significant and extremely important point.

You have pinpointed the proposition of the main objective of the Navy, and I hope it is the objective of all of us, to try to prevent a third world war.

And I would like to read for the record here just a very short excerpt from your statement, on page 6, to reemphasize.

You say:

> For wars to remain limited, there should continue to be a readiness to negotiate after military action has been undertaken—and a willingness to settle for less than the maximum, if circumstances demonstrate that to be the best thing to do.
>
> Opportunities to change objectives without loss of face should remain open to both sides. Neither side should be driven into a corner from which an act of desperation appears to him to be the only way out. National emotions must be held within reasonable bounds. An obvious readiness to use maximum force, including nuclear weapons, may be necessary to achieve desired objectives in limited war, and to check any inclination on the part of the opponent to extend or intensify the conflict.

Then on page 7, as a concluding thought, which incorporates that philosophy and a few other matters, you state:

> The great bulk of our future Navy is designed to meet these needs—to provide the spear and the shield for the free world's ability to defeat limited aggression without incurring unlimited catastrophe.

I want to say to you that that is one of the finest statements in my judgment that has been made to this committee. As we say out our way, maybe in the whole country, that is right down my alley, and I think that every ounce of energy that we possess should be exercised toward that great objective of trying to prevent a third world war. If it must come and is forced upon us, we of course will do everything within our power to win it as much as a modern world war can be won.

But I want to take this opportunity to say to you that I think that is a most excellent statement, and I do hope that we can achieve that objective.

And if this H. R. 11518 will accomplish that or work toward that end, I want you to know that I personally will support it with great enthusiasm.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Morris.

Let's members of the committee, sum up this bill.

As I understand it——

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Price.

Mr. PRICE. Directed to the first paragraph on page 6 where you said:

> The French-British failure at Suez was the result of the inability to apply the right force at the right place fast enough.

I didn't think the failure at Suez was a military failure at all.

I thought it was a political failure.

Admiral FELT. Well, there was probably some of both, sir.

Mr. PRICE. It was a halfhearted effort. If they would have gone in there, they would have applied the right force at the right time with the right emphasis, wouldn't they?

Admiral FELT. But from the military point of view, their big weakness was they did not have an amphibious force. Their carrier air was there, bombing days before they could get any troops into the area.

Mr. PRICE. Do you think, then, if they had had an amphibious force, that crisis over there might have been more serious than it was?

Admiral FELT. They could have won it.

Mr. PRICE. They could have won it?

They did win it, but it was taken away. It would still have been taken away, wouldn't it?

It was either take it away, or we would have really been into it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's not get into Suez.

Mr. PRICE. It was in the statement; I didn't put it in.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Now members of the committee, to sum up this bill. From the hearings it developed that this authorizes 20,000 tons of amphibious types of ships, and landing craft. It is estimated to cost $69 million. It provides for the building of 1 amphibious transport dock, and 1 amphibious assault ship and to acquire from the Maritime Commission a hull that will be converted into an amphibious assault ship. That is all the bill—and 39 landing craft.

That is the high point of the bill, is it not?

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, all in favor—wait. I think, Admiral, there should be an amendment, on line 6, after the word "craft", I think we should write out "one amphibious-transport dock and one amphibious assault"—ship, or transport? What is the correct word?

Admiral MUMMA. One amphibious assault ship should be the first one, sir. That is the one that carries helicopters.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral MUMMA. And the second one should be amphibious transport dock.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Without objection, the amendment is agreed to. Now, call the roll. All in favor of this bill to be reported as amended when your name is called, vote "aye," and all opposed "no."

(Rollcall.)

Mr. SMART. Mr. Chairman, on this vote there are 26 yeas and no nays.

The CHAIRMAN. As the clerk has announced, 26 voting in the affirmative, and no votes cast in the negative, so I am authorized to report the bill to the House.

I will proceed to get a rule, but I will not call it up until after Easter.

Now wait a minute, members. Before I take up another phase of this shipbuilding program, which I consider the committee is deeply concerned about, I want to make this brief statement, I want to thank all the members for participating in the debate yesterday. We can all be proud of our accomplishment in passing such a worthwhile and outstanding piece of legislation, as we did yesterday.

Now, after we adjourn today, there will be no more meetings of the committee until after the 14th day of April, when the Easter recess is over.

And when the recess is over, one of the first bills I want to ask the committee is a bill requiring cadets and midshipmen and aviation cadets when they enter the Academy must be required to serve a definite period of years, which we will develop as a result of the testimony when the bill is called up.

Then I am very anxious also that the subcommittees that have been given particular work to do will try to expedite the subject matter before them so we can write our report on the defense situation as soon as is possible to do so.

I am hoping that by the end of the Easter recess we may have a report from the Department as to its reorganization plan. We already have bills pending in the Congress along that line. I am glad to note in the paper that two Senators have adopted the idea. But we must try to close up our work as an investigating committee on the posture of the Defense Department, at the earliest possible date.

Now, you know it is not necessary for this committee to make authorizations for ship construction of combatant types. We have enough tonnage to last a great many more years. And we have a very healthy, large construction bill under construction now, and a very healthy bill involving some billion or more dollars and some 83 ships coming up in the 1959 appropriation bill.

All the Department has to do is go before the Appropriations Committee, and get the money. We have previously given them, back in olden days, enough tonnage to last almost to the end of time. So they don't have to come here.

But I do think it is important that we know something about it. So I am going to ask the two admirals this morning to tell us now what is in the 1959 appropriation bill for ship construction, and conversion.

Now, my information is that there are 83 ships, and that the cost of these 83 ships will run around—including what we are building—$3,800 million. We are entitled to know something about it before we go to the floor of the House when the appropriation bill comes up, because we are trusting the Department without getting specific authorizations.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, before you start could I make one statement, since you brought it up yesterday about what happened on the floor.

I, too, feel that we did an exceptionally fine job. There is only one thing, that I talked about to Mr. Blandford, counsel for the subcommittee, earlier.

While yesterday might not have been the most opportune time to do this——

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, we can't hear.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I was thinking in terms of something that might well have been written into that bill, of a prohibition against the early retirement of qualified officers in the service.

In other words, if they were to retire at too early a time, maybe having completed 20 or 30 years, yet, I think there should have been some kind of a penalty attached to early retirement, when after all the years and what we have made possible and available to them in the way of schooling and education during the service, then at the time when we need them, as has been emphasized by the retirement of certain officers in recent months—that there be some penalty attached to the retirement pay.

I thought that should have been considered, but it was not. Maybe it was not opportune to do that at that particular time. I think we ought to bear that in mind.

I regret to see the qualified man—we certainly want to keep the qualified enlisted man and certainly the qualified officer in the service at the present because we need them badly. I think that ought to have the consideration of this committee at some time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Arends. I think there is great merit to what Mr. Arends said. My only observation is that we don't want to do everything in one bill.

Mr. ARENDS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now members of the committee, let's get some information about the shipbuilding program.

This is very important.

Admiral FELT. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Rose, who chairs a committee in the Staff of the CNO to study and advise the Chief of Naval Operations on shipbuilding programs is here with me. This is Admiral Rose.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

Admiral FELT. He is prepared in about 15 minutes to walk right through the 1959 program.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral FELT. Would you like that?

The CHAIRMAN. Start right off.

Go right ahead.

Admiral ROSE. Mr. Chairman, I will briefly describe the ships in the program, with pictures.

I would like to make four points as to what we have considered chiefly in the preparation of this program.

First, major emphasis is given to our antisubmarine problem, which, as you know, is one of the Navy's most important. And all ships except two in this program will contribute directly to our antisubmarine effort at sea.

Second, the fact that missiles and new weapons systems are so essential to meet modern threats. This has been emphasized in all the new types of ships.

Third, we are going to put nuclear propulsion in ships where it is justified by the military advantage to be gained.

Last, in our committee as well as in the entire Navy Department, we must balance our effort in each major program, as in this case shipbuilding, and with the other programs.

Subject to that, sir, I would like to explain the ships which are contained in our program.

Can that be seen?

The CHAIRMAN. We can all see.

Admiral ROSE. The first ship is a conversion of heavy cruiser hulls, two of them in this case, to guided-missile ships. These ships will have no guns. They will have our long-range Talos, surface-to-air missile, both forward and aft, and closer range, Tartar type surface-to-air missiles.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait one minute, Admiral.

Admiral ROSE. I am sorry, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Until we adjust the lights.

Admiral ROSE. I will keep talking, sir, so as to not take your time.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral Rose. This ship will also be capable of carrying a surface-to-surface, long-range missile, probably of the Regulus type, which is an air-breathing missile.

In addition these types—and there were three of these in last years program—will have an antisubmarine capability. They will have the same type of new sonars, which is underwater detection device, and above-water torpedo tubes, as will have the destroyers and frigates which I will describe in just a minute.

There is an unusual shape to this ship because of the need for a tremendous amount of electronics, and radar of various types, for guiding the missiles and for detecting incoming aircraft.

Two of these ships in the program, sir.

The next type of ship is a destroyer, a guided missile destroyer. Any destroyer must be a versatile ship. We never have enough. We always need more capabilities in them.

This ship will be a versatile ship. It will be nearly twice the tonnage of the familiar World War II, 2,200-ton ships. Its armament will be two 5-inch rapid-fire mounts, one forward and one aft, and the twin launcher for our Tarta, surface-to-air, air defense, type of guided missile, mounted aft.

In addition, the ship will have the most modern underwater detection equipment—sonar, and above water a projector for projecting an antisubmarine rocket, and also above water, antisubmarine water torpedo tubes, a tremendous advantage of this ship over the World War II ships.

Incidentally, sir, these were in the 1957 and 1958 program. This is a continuation of a program.

They will provide quite good space for a unit commander who will have to direct either units of destroyer types or to do some other antisubmarine job. And these ships will have as modern and as good radars and other detection equipment as is possible to put on a ship of this size.

I make that point, because the next ship is also in general a destroyer type, but it will be bigger. In a true destroyer, even though it be a 4,000-ton ship, you can't put the amount of control space for the very complicated devices we now need to control the air battle and the antisubmarine battle. These new ships we now call frigates. They are very large destroyers. These ships will operate well out from the center of the force and they will have to have the ability to provide the facilities—the communications, the plotting facilities and so forth—for a unit commander to be able to coordinate their effort with the efforts of the other ships.

The battery of this ship will be our Terrier, which is the same kind of guided missile we now have in the *Boston* and *Canberra*, with twin launchers forward and aft. But since these are still destroyer types—remember, the destroyer itself had two 5-inch guns. They will carry light guns, 3-inch fifty-caliber.

Why carry guns in the modern age?

Because a destroyer may encounter a surfaced submarine, an enemy destroyer or a merchant ship that it wants to do something about. The main armament will be missiles. These are large ships. They are nearly the size of World War II antiaircraft cruisers. It is interesting that they will have just half as many people to run

them, although they are much more powerful ships. The crew will be only a little over 300, instead of 600, as the antiaircraft cruisers had.

Again, antisubmarine warfare. These ships will have the same submarine detection and destruction capability as had the destroyer which I just described.

The next ship is again a frigate, and this is a new type. This will be a guided-missile frigate with nuclear propulsion. This is the smallest surface ship, in which we have been able to put nuclear power.

As you know, sir, we have the guided-missile cruiser, the *Long Beach*, in the 1957 program.

We have a nuclear-propelled carrier in the 1958 program.

And this will be the smallest surface ship in which we have been able to put nuclear power.

Mr. DURHAM. What do you have?

You just have one in the program this year?

Admiral ROSE. Just one. This is the first ship. And normally we put only one ship of a brand new type in a program, with the kind of dollars we have to think about now, sir. This is usually wise.

Mr. DURHAM. Can you use more?

Admiral ROSE. I think that one would probably—this ship being a brand new ship—for this year, be enough. We certainly would want more in the future.

Mr. MILLER. How long will it be?

Admiral ROSE. Do you have the exact length?

Admiral MUMMA. 600 tons larger than the other ship, sir.

Admiral ROSE. But on length? It will be a 7,300-ton ship, sir. As Admiral Mumma stated, it will be about 600 tons heavier than the conventionally propelled frigate. Its length will be 555 feet. The battery, again: Twin Terrier guided-missile launchers, both forward and aft. Small rapid-fire guns. Above-water torpedo tubes. And an antisubmarine rocket to project antisubmarine depth charges against a submarine at long distance.

Admiral ROSE. Next ship is a submarine, and an important one. This is our guided-missile submarine for launching the Regulus type of guided missile, which is a surface-to-surface missile with long range.

This ship will carry four of them.

This type of submarine must surface in order to launch its missile, but the process is done very quickly. Once it is up, the launching process can be done very rapidly.

Mr. DURHAM. When will that be ready?

Admiral ROSE. When is she complete?

Admiral MUMMA. That ship in the 1959 program will complete in 1961. But we have a ship of that type that completes next year.

Admiral ROSE. This is not a new type. We had identical ships in last year's program. In addition to being a very powerful missile-firing submarine, every submarine in the Navy from now on will also have a very fine antisubmarine capability.

And for ships other than our guided-missiles submarines, this now becomes the primary duty of our submarines, is antisubmarine kill capability.

In other words, it will have detection equipment and torpedo tubes for destruction of enemy submarines or of enemy surface ships.

Mr. GUBSER. That ship can't ever be adapted at some later date for use of Polaris, can it?

Admiral ROSE. It wouldn't be profitable to do so, sir.

We want these any way. The missiles will do different things and the actual design of the ship is quite different. But we want these submarines to carry the Regulus-type missile for a different kind of a job.

The next ship is a submarine. We call it a fleet-attack submarine, but chiefly it is an antisubmarine submarine. It features very high speed, and note the clean lines. We developed in the last few years a ship called the *Albacore*. As a matter of fact, I will touch on that ship in a moment.

The things that we found out about ship control and hull form for high-speed submarines from that experimental ship now show themselves in our newest production of regular fleet submarines—nuclear propelled. All our new submarines are nuclear propelled from now on.

Notice almost no bridge on this ship, to make the cleanest possible lines for high speed through the water. Her job is to detect and to kill enemy ships, but primarily enemy submarines. She will have a most unique capability for detection. The whole bow here contains detection equipment. It will carry a large number of torpedoes for the destruction of enemy submarines or of enemy surface ships.

Next ship.

You will recall, sir, that we built two nuclear submarines in rapid succession—the *Nautilus* and the *Seawolf*. The *Nautilus* had for its propulsion what we call a pressurized water reactor. The *Seawolf*, the second ship, had a different type of reactor which has proved to not as reliable or as good as was the *Nautilus* reactor. All other reactors in our program, both in submarines and in surface ships, have pressurized water reactors. It is our proposal this year that the powerplant of the *Seawolf* be replaced by a powerplant of the general type of the *Nautilus*, which has proven very reliable and very satisfactory.

It will also make a difference in our training program. Everyone will be trained to operate the same kind of a nuclear powerplant. That is the job here, to replace the powerplant in this ship.

Now, we will discuss the amphibious ships. The first one is the conversion, which Admiral Felt and Admiral Mumma described, of a Mariner class ship, which is a very fine 22- to 23-knot merchant ship, into an attack transport, the APA.

The ship will carry a battalion landing team, about 1,800 Marines, and their essential equipment, for landing primarily by landing craft, which this ship can carry, or other landing craft, but also it will have space for two of the large Marine assault helicopters to be carried aft. These ships will also be used as flagships in the amphibious business. There the communications and control are very most important things. It will have excellent equipment and spaces for the unit commander.

Mr. GAVIN. It can carry GI's as well as Marines.

Admiral ROSE. Yes, sir. We keep in very close contact——

Mr. DEVEREUX. If they don't get seasick. [Laughter.]

Mr. GAVIN. I didn't hear you, so I won't comment.

Admiral ROSE. The next ship is the one which is very similar to the landship ship, dock, which was referred to earlier. It has identically the same hull as the postwar so-called Thomaston class, LSD's.

The differences are really these. In a landing ship, dock, this well would be open and would extend about up to this area. In this ship the well is smaller. It will carry one landing craft utility. This is how we get tanks, and the heavy equipment ashore—in a landing craft, utility, a 150-ton landing craft. This ship will carry 1 of those, and 3 of our big metal landing craft, mechanized LCM's, or can carry 9 of these LCM's, or can carry DUKW's or LVT's—any kind of amphibious craft.

This ship, having this deck covered over, decked over, can handle six of these large Marine HRZS, assault helicopters. The advantage of this ship is that it can carry about 900 troops, and land them either by helicopter or by landing craft.

It can carry their heavy equipment—by that I mean tanks, which is the heaviest thing we have to get ashore—for landing in something like a landing craft, utility. It can do this while it is under way.

As a matter of fact, the standard practice, having the ship ballasted down, is to open the stern gate and just proceed along slowly and launch the landing craft.

This will be a new type ship, first of its type, and we believe it is going to be very satisfactory. Everybody likes it.

The next ship is a repeat of one which was in last year's program, but it is really a new type as far as the amphibious business is concerned. This is the amphibious assault ship. We converted one in the 1955 program—the *Thetis Bay*, which has been mentioned. We have one other conversion in the 1957 program. The advantages of this new ship over any kind of a conversion—and we have wrestled with this at great length, sir. You asked the question earlier why didn't we use existing ships. May I mention a few advantages. We, of course, will give you the study you requested. Marines and their equipment ready to land make up quite a heavy package. The equipment has to be stowed below, so as to give stability to the ship. We actually need conveyors or elevators to get this heavy equipment up to the flight deck.

To manhandle it would take many more men. The marine himself with all his equipment on board makes a very heavy package, and to walk from say his living compartment, which is down 3 or 4 decks below the flight deck, to the flight deck is quite a job. So we have provided mechanical means to assist. There are elevators on the side for the planes. These elevators can also take equipment from the hangar deck to the flght deck, there will be below-decks elevators for getting this heavy equipment up to where it can be embarked in the helicopters.

Mr. BATES. You have elevators for your planes today on the *Essex* class.

Admiral ROSE. That is right, sir, from the hangar deck only, sir.

Mr. BATES. Yes.

Admiral ROSE. This is true, sir.

But you can't put on the hangar deck all of the equipment that the Marines need. Now, we do this, sir, in an emergency. As a matter of fact, in the exercise we are having in the Atlantic right now; as you

probably noticed in the paper, sir, they are using regular aircraft carriers for transporting marines and helicopters.

This we will do regularly and in emergencies. We can take any kind of aircraft carrier and put a landing force abroad it. But for the long haul, there are two problems. In the first place, you need your aircraft carriers as aircraft carriers. I am not talking about those in the Reserve fleet. But in active commission, you need them as aircraft carriers.

You need your amphibious ships for a different job. And they can't be available for both at the same time.

We will, of course, sir, give you the study that you asked for on the matter of using possibly *Essex* class carriers for amphibious assault ships. We have spent some time on that. But this, as I say, will be the second ship of this type the Navy has. It will make all the difference in our ability to land across any kind of beach—this vertical envelopment concept. It just makes the difference between yes and no in landing over a bad beach, and in dispersal of the ships in the sea. They can be 50 miles apart or 50 miles from the shore, if you want.

It is a new concept, and we think a very sensible one for landing. One thing I would like to clear up. There is no thought that all of the marines' equipment will be landed by helicopters. It would just simply be impossible to land tanks, for instance, at 60 or 70 tons each at the present time.

There is no intention of so doing. So there will be landing ships dock, and even some fast landing ships, and other means of getting the heavy equipment ashore.

Next ship.

This is an ammunition ship. As you know, one of the reasons that the United States Navy was able to stay at sea, in combatant ships, 90 days at a time during World War II was our ability to replenish at sea. But the problem has changed. Instead of having what we used to call beans and bullets, nothing heavier than probably a 16-inch shell to be replenished, now we have missiles. The Talos missile that I showed you on the very first ship will weigh many thousand pounds, and other missiles will be correspondingly heavy and delicate.

This new ammunition ship will have the most modern devices for stowage of missiles, ammunition and explosives, for handling those things up to the main deck, for transferring them from this ship to the combatant ship, which comes alongside, underway, as you know, and doing all this very rapidly.

The replenishment process must be done rapidly, because you want to, one, get back on the line and have your combatant ship ready to fight, and in the second place you don't want to have yourself near your supply ships for too long a time.

This is the only ship of its type which is in this program.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Is this like the *Suribachi* or not?

Admiral ROSE. It will be very similar to the *Suribachi* class. There were five of those postwar, yes, sir.

Next ship.

This job is a slight modification on the *Albacore*, which is our experimental submarine. A very fast ship, not nuclear powered, but very fast for a short distance.

The change in this ship will be to do further development work on the sail area, and the controls.

This ship is fast enough so that her underwater handling is very much like handling an airplane. We have learned tremendously from this ship, which is an experimental one, what must be done on our combatant submarines of the future.

This job, which costs $1.7 million, is an alteration, and we are presenting it as part of the regular shipbuilding bill to make it clear what we are going to do. It is a change in the controls and some safety features which will enable us to operate this ship at a higher speed.

The last ship on the program is a seaplane tender. These are conversions on World War II LSD's. As you will recall, the LSD was capable of ballasting down, and landing craft went into this well arrangement.

We have determined that it is possible to do this same sort of thing with the seaplane, and particularly the very large and heavy *Seamaster*, the P6M, which Martin is building. The airplane then never has to be lifted by a crane.

In other words, the ship ballasts down, the airplane is towed into this well, the ship deballasts, and there it is. And it is dry and in drydock.

In addition to the ability to drydock the ship, a seaplane can be serviced, that is personnel, fuel, and supplies given to it by means of a boom which swings out from the side of the ship. There are three of these ships in the program. That is all of the ships. The rest are landing craft and small ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Now, Admiral Mumma, the committee would like to know: The shipbuilding program of 1958——

Admiral MUMMA. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many ships were involved in that? How many are you building now?

Admiral MUMMA. To summarize the current situation of the shipbuilding program, Mr. Chairman, there are some 95 fleet naval vessels being built at the present time; 60 of these are classified as major combatant ships—aircraft carriers down through and including escort vessels. And they are, for example, 4 carriers, 8 destroyers, 5 destroyer escorts, 8 guided-missile destroyers, 13 guided missile frigates, 3 submarines conventionally powered, 11 submarines nuclear powered of the attack type, a total of 5 guided missiles of which 2 of them are conventional powered and 3 nuclear powered, 1 radar picket submarine nuclear powered, 1 guided missile cruiser nuclear powered, 1 LPH or amphibious assault ship similar to the 1 we have just seen. That completes the list of the 60 ships now in progress, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, can the committee understand that the keel has been laid and the work is progressing on these sixty-some-odd ships?

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the date of completion will vary, of course. But those ships will be finished within the next 2 or 3 years.

Admiral MUMMA. Yes, sir. They will all be completed prior to 1962.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Now, that is the program and money has been available for that, and that program is being carried out in industrial yards and in navy yards; is that correct?

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have followed the policy, as far as possible, of having a 50–50 division; is that correct?

Admiral MUMMA. I didn't get that last statement, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I say you followed the policy as far as possible of carrying out the 50–50 division.

Admiral MUMMA. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, that gives us the information about the 1958 program. Now, the 1958 program involved how much money for ship construction?

Admiral MUMMA. The 1958 program consisted of a total of 1,381,000, which was broken down into various categories. It consisted fundamentally—the first and major ship in the program was the carrier, the 1958 nuclear-powered carrier. I am trying to find that piece of paper, Mr. Chairman, if you will excuse me just a second——

Mr. KELLEHER. The figure, coincidentally, is exactly the same as for the 1959 program; is that correct?

Admiral MUMMA. No, sir. The correct figure is $1,413,400,000.

Mr. KELLEHER. The 1.381 is the 1959——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, to sum it up——

Admiral MUMMA. Just a moment.

The CHAIRMAN. The 1958 program of combatant ships is going to cost in the neighborhod of $1,300 million. Is that correct?

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in addition to the combatant program of 1958, you have some auxiliary in the 1958 program, do you not?

Admiral MUMMA. In the 1958 program we did have some auxiliary ships, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral MUMMA. But of course you probably remember in the review of the 1958 program last year, sir, we deleted one ship from the program as a result of congressional action, which was the AV, that is the seaplane tender.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

How large an amphibious program was provided for in the 1958 shipbuilding program?

Admiral FELT. One ship, sir.

Admiral MUMMA. Only the one, and that is the LPH.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Turn to 1959.

That is the bill now pending before the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. DURHAM. Wait a moment, Mr. Chairman. Will all of your 11 submarines be completed by 1962?

Admiral MUMMA. Yes, sir, they will all be completed by 1962, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, take——

Mr. DURHAM. And ready for commission.

Admiral MUMMA. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. DURHAM. They will be.

Admiral MUMMA. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions in regard to the 1958 program?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. If not, we will turn to the 1959 program now pending before the Appropriations Committee.

Now, that calls for 83 ships, does it not?

Admiral MUMMA. Including the craft, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right, 83 ships.

How many of those ships are combatant ships?

Admiral MUMMA. There are no major combatant ships larger than cruisers included in this new construction program, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Read off now what constitutes the composition of the 1959 fiscal shipbuilding program.

Admiral MUMMA. It consists of 6 DLG, guided-missile frigates, 5 DDG's guided-missile destroyers, and 1 nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate, as well as 4 attack submarines nuclear powered, and 1 guided-missile submarine nuclear powered, one amphibious transport dock, one amphibious assault ship, and one ammunition ship.

That completes the new construction list.

There are, of the types we have just seem, 2 guided-missile cruisers, which are conversions, 1 conversion of the *Seawolf*, that is the changing of its powerplant; 1 conversion of a Mariner ship to an attack transport; 1 conversion of the auxiliary submarine, which is the research ship, namely, the *Albacore;* and 3 conversions of the seaplane tenders, that is the AV's that we saw last on the pictures.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how much is the cost? Now, my figures show that the cost for the 1959 shipbuilding program, sent by the budget to the Appropriations Committee, is $1,381 million; is that correct?

Admiral MUMMA. The shipbuilding portion of that program, sir, is $1,159 million.

The additional funds mentioned just a moment ago are caused by the increases added to this shipbuilding program for electronics.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral MUMMA. Advance procurement, and other items.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the Appropriations Committee has now a program for 1959 consisting of 83 ships of various types, that will cost in the neighborhood of $1,100 million, that is pending before the Appropriations Committee now.

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct, for the ships alone, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All that has had the clearance of the budget.

Admiral MUMMA. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have had your hearings before the Appropriations Committee on that part.

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct.

They are completed, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions by any members of the committee?

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Price——

Mr. PRICE. Under which one of the budget submissions does the Polaris submarines come in?

Admiral MUMMA. They come in the 1958 supplemental budget, Mr. Price.

Mr. PRICE. There is nothing in the budget for the additional Polaris submarines.

Admiral MUMMA. That is now being considered at the present time by the Department of Defense.

Mr. PRICE. In order to meet your schedule for Polaris that you have projected here for the next few years, you are going to have to have some in the 1959 budget.

Admiral MUMMA. Well, our original 1959 budget included some plan for Polaris, but they were moved up into 1958 when the program was accelerated, and the thought of additional Polaris submarines is now under consideration by the Department of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. You took care of three Polaris submarines in the supplementary bill.

Admiral MUMMA. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are giving consideration as to whether or not you will ask for authority to construct six more; is that correct?

Admiral FELT. We have asked for that, sir. It is under consideration in the Department of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's clear that up. Of course, you do not have to get an authorization. Then you have gone to the budget, or through regular channels, to ask for laying down six additional Polaris-type submarines; is that correct?

Admiral FELT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is pending in the budget now.

Admiral FELT. That is pending in the Department of Defense now, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Pending in the Department of Defense.

I am glad to have that information. I didn't know that happened.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question?

With the advent of the guided-missile-carrying submarines of the Polaris type, why don't you build all your future submarines of that type?

Admiral FELT. Well, the Polaris submarine is a special type of ship.

Mr. PRICE. It is an offensive submarine.

Admiral FELT. It is designed for just one thing, and that is to deter general war or fire ballistic missiles in case, God forbid, we have this nuclear exchange. It has no other capabilities.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. PRICE. What is the place, the general place of the submarine in antisubmarine warfare?

Admiral FELT. Well, as Admiral Rose stated, the primary mission of submarines today is antisubmarine warfare, that is for the so-called attack submarines.

The submarine has joined the family of antisubmarine weapons systems.

The reason for this is: it is a little complicated, but in the first place, we don't visualize a submarine and the surface ship campaign of the magnitude that we had in World War II. That meant that the submariners needed to get into some other kind of business. They have not done so. And we think they will be a very valuable adjunct to the antisubmarine warfare team.

Mr. PRICE. Wouldn't that be making it almost primarily, then, a defense weapon?

Admiral FELT. Well, if you speak in strategic terms, yes, sir.

Mr. PRICE. Don't you think——

Admiral FELT. If you speak in strategic terms, I call antisubmarine warfare defensive.

Mr. PRICE. Don't you think there is a greater mission for it and a greater importance for it as an offensive weapon, particularly since you have gone to the ballistic missile-carrying types, of the Polaris type?

Admiral FELT. Well, as I said before, Mr. Price, we visualize the Polaris missile as being an offensive weapon, perhaps one of the best in the stable of this Nation, to deter general war or to fight general war if it should have to be fought. But in the context of a limited war, no, it doesn't figure.

Mr. PRICE. We seem to know—we have pretty good information, intelligence, about what the Russians are doing in building up their submarine fleet. Why don't we build submarine for submarine along with them?

Admiral FELT. Well, I think in the first place a military commander chooses his own weapons instead of the weapons of the other fellow. I don't think personally that it is logical for the United States Navy to try to compete with the Russian on the basis of one weapon against a similar weapon.

The Russia strategy I think is to disrupt the sea lines of communications with our friends. Our basic strategy is to take the war away from the shores of the United States, and project it into the enemy's lands. If we tried to build submarine for submarine, a great lot of our resources would be poured into this which we think should be better placed.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, any of this conversation you carried on with Mr. Price or the committee: Is that confidential or classified?

Mr. BATES. We are not in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not in executive session. I wouldn't say it is.

Mr. PRICE. I wouldn't think it is, but I will defer the discussion. I don't think it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bates, any questions?

Mr. BATES. Not in open session, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gubser?

Mr. GUBSER. Admiral, are you at liberty to tell us when the request of the Navy Department for six additional Polaris-type submarines for fiscal 1959 was transmitted to the Defense Department, the request which is currently pending?

Admiral FELT. I can only make an approximation.

Mr. GUBSER. Would you like to supply it later?

Admiral FELT. Yes. I would.

Mr. GUBSER. Thank you.

Admiral FELT. I will supply the date later.

(The information requested follows:)

The recommendation from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of Defense was submitted January 30, 1958.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, I can recognize and we can all recognize there are so many channels down there, and so many civilians it must go through that it will take a long time.

But I am hoping we will be able to handle that later on. Thank you very much, Admiral. It is a pleasure to have had you.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Miller——

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I was wondering wether you were going to pose the question for the 1959 program that you did for 1958, relative to the 50–50 distribution?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

The law does that.

Mr. MILLER. I just wondered whether the chairman would bring that out by a question.

Admiral MUMMA. Except, Mr. Chairman, for the cases in which the President certifies——

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Admiral MUMMA. That it is in the public interest to deviate therefrom.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. We want to thank you two admirals for your valuable testimony. The committee has acted favorably upon your bill. We will proceed with due diligence to have it acted upon and considered by the House.

Mr. SMART. You have another bill.

The CHAIRMAN. What other bill?

Mr. KELLEHER. 11519, Mr. Chairman, on the experimental ships.

The CHAIRMAN. We don't have a quorum here. They are gone. I didn't know about that.

Mr. SMART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I forgot that.

Mr. KELLEHER. Two were set up, sir.

Mr. NORBLAD. Without objection.

(Mr. Kelleher aside.)

Mr. NORBLAD. Without objection——

The CHAIRMAN. We can't do it. We have to have a hearing on it. We have to have a quorum.

Well, now, let's see.

This means shooting up some of the old ships; doesn't it? [Laughter.]

Admiral?

Admiral FELT. Yes, that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Well, now, let me tell you. Off the record——

(Further statement off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Let's don't do any destruction today.

Let's build up.

Admiral MUMMA. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, we should have a hearing on this.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we are going to have a hearing.

Mr. BATES. We touched on that point a little earlier.

We are maintaining a lot of ships at a high maintenance cost and if they can be utilized for some functions we certainly should do it.

The CHAIRMAN. We have to have a quorum and we don't have a quorum this morning.

We will set this down.

Thank you very much, Admiral.

(At 11:35 a. m., the committee adjourned.)

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